

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

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AONRAI C. JERRY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:24-cv-581

v.

Honorable Sally J. Berens

HEIDI WASHINGTON et al.,

Defendants.

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**OPINION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Plaintiff has also moved the Court to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff has also submitted a proposed order to show cause for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 3.) The Court construes that submission as a motion seeking immediate injunctive relief. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 9.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. *See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act*, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).

Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a

defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process." *Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.*, 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). "Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant." *Id.* at 350. "[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend." *Id.* (citations omitted). That is, "[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the *sine qua non* directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights." *Id.* at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. *See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't*, 212 F. App'x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) ("Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.").

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that "[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. *See Neals v. Norwood*, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The record does not contain a

consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to th[e] action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).<sup>1</sup>

Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Washington, Davis, Reynolds, and Highsmith for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, and Jenkins, *except* Plaintiff’s claims regarding those Defendants’ use of excessive force on February 2, 2023, at approximately 2:00 p.m. That Eighth Amendment excessive force claim remains in the case.

### **Discussion**

#### **I. Motion to Appoint Counsel**

Plaintiff has requested a court-appointed attorney. (ECF No. 2.) Indigent parties in civil cases have no constitutional right to a court-appointed attorney. *Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. Dep’t of*

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<sup>1</sup> *But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis.*, 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in *Murphy Bros.* was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); *Williams v. King*, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing *Murphy Bros.*); *Burton v. Schamp*, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).

*Corr.*, 65 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1995); *Lavado v. Keohane*, 992 F.2d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1993). The Court may, however, request an attorney to serve as counsel, in the Court’s discretion. *Abdur-Rahman*, 65 F.3d at 492; *Lavado*, 992 F.2d at 604–05; *see Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct.*, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).

Appointment of counsel is a privilege that is justified only in exceptional circumstances. In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court should consider the complexity of the issues, the procedural posture of the case, and Plaintiff’s apparent ability to prosecute the action without the help of counsel. *See Lavado*, 992 F.2d at 606. The Court has carefully considered these factors and determines that, at this stage of the case, the assistance of counsel does not appear necessary to the proper presentation of Plaintiff’s position. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel will be denied.

## **II. Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief**

Plaintiff asks the Court for an order enjoining Defendants “from all violation of the United States Constitution.” (ECF No. 3, PageID.13.) Preliminary injunctions are ““one of the most drastic tools in the arsenal of judicial remedies.”” *Bonnell v. Lorenzo*, 241 F.3d 800, 808 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting *Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc.*, 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986)). And Plaintiff’s request for relief is particularly broad.

The issuance of preliminary injunctive relief is committed to the discretion of the district court. *See Northeast Ohio Coal. v. Blackwell*, 467 F.3d 999, 1009 (6th Cir. 2006); *Nader v. Blackwell*, 230 F.3d 833, 834 (6th Cir. 2000). In exercising that discretion, a court must consider whether plaintiff has established the following elements: (1) a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the likelihood of irreparable injury if the preliminary injunction does not issue; (3) the absence of harm to other parties; and (4) the protection of the public interest by issuance of the injunction. *Nader*, 230 F.3d at 834. These factors are not prerequisites to the grant

or denial of injunctive relief, but factors that must be “carefully balanced” by the district court in exercising its equitable powers. *Frisch’s Rest., Inc. v. Shoney’s, Inc.*, 759 F.2d 1261, 1263 (6th Cir. 1985); *see also Southern Glazer’s Distrib. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co.*, 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[T]hese are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites to be met.”); *National Viatical, Inc. v. Universal Settlements Int’l, Inc.*, 716 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); *Nebraska Ohio Coal.*, 467 F.3d at 1009 (same); *Nader*, 230 F.3d at 834 (same). “But even the strongest showing on the other three factors cannot ‘eliminate the irreparable harm requirement.’” *D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch.*, 942 F.3d 324, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick, Inc.*, 679 F.2d 100, 105 (6th Cir. 1982)).

Moreover, where a prison inmate seeks an order enjoining state prison officials, the court is required to proceed with the utmost care and must recognize the unique nature of the prison setting. *See Glover v. Johnson*, 855 F.2d 277, 286 (6th Cir. 1988); *Kendrick v. Bland*, 740 F.2d 432, 438 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1984). The party seeking injunctive relief bears a heavy burden of establishing that the extraordinary and drastic remedy sought is appropriate under the circumstances. *See Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t*, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002); *Stenberg v. Cheker Oil Co.*, 573 F.2d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 1978). Preliminary injunctions are not favored, and a movant is not necessarily entitled to such relief, even if the movant has shown likelihood of success on the merits. *Benisek v. Lamone*, 585 U.S. 155, 158 (2018).

Under controlling Sixth Circuit authority, Plaintiff’s “initial burden” in demonstrating entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief is a showing of a strong or substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his section 1983 action. *NAACP v. Mansfield*, 866 F.2d 162, 167 (6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has not made such a showing. As set forth below, only one excessive force claim

based on an event that occurred more than two years ago is properly stated. All of Plaintiff's other allegations fail to state a cognizable claim.

With regard to the one incident that remains, it is not at all clear from Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint that he has a substantial likelihood of success on his Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff acknowledges that he "acted out" and contends that the remaining Defendants' response involved more force than was necessary. There will undoubtedly be conflicting accounts of the need for force and the amount of force necessary to restore order. Although the Court makes no final determination on this issue, it appears at this preliminary stage that Plaintiff has not made a substantial showing of a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.

Second, the presence of irreparable harm is not evident. A plaintiff's harm from the denial of a preliminary injunction is irreparable only if it is not fully compensable by monetary damages. *See Overstreet*, 305 F.3d at 578; *see also D.T. v. Sumner Cnty. Sch.*, 942 F.3d 324, 326 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that, absent a showing of irreparable harm, a preliminary injunction is not appropriate, regardless of the strength of the other factors). There is no evidence that the three remaining Defendants have since engaged in any of the activities from which Plaintiff seeks to restrain them. Plaintiff has not set forth specific facts showing an immediate, concrete and irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

Finally, the interests of identifiable third parties and the public at large weigh against an injunction. Decisions concerning prison security are vested in prison officials in the absence of a constitutional violation. Any interference by the federal courts in the administration of state prisons is necessarily disruptive. The public welfare therefore militates against the issuance of extraordinary relief in the prison context, absent a sufficient showing of a violation of

constitutional rights. *See Glover*, 855 F.2d at 286–87. That showing has not been made here. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for preliminary relief will be denied.

### III. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues MDOC Director Heidi Washington and the following ICF personnel: Warden John Davis; Captain Unknown Party #1; Lieutenant Unknown Party #2; Sergeant Unknown Jenkins; and Correctional Officers Unknown Reynolds and Unknown Highsmith. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1–2.) Plaintiff sues each individual Defendant in that Defendant’s personal and official capacities. (*Id.*, PageID.3.)

Chronologically, Plaintiff’s complaint begins during February of 2023. Plaintiff reports that, on that date, he “acted out . . . supposedly he assaulted Defendant Unknown Reynolds.”<sup>2</sup> (*Id.*) Thereafter, Plaintiff states: “six [officers] piled on me to secure the arrest, as they were trying to restrain me, one of the sergeants punched me in the gut while placing me in the restraining chair, another pulled at my neck trying to collapse one of my arteries!!!” (*Id.*) Plaintiff also elaborates: “[I] was . . . assaulted by [an] officer Feb. 2, 2023, roughly around 2:00 p.m., when I was thrown to the ground by Officer Jenkins, punched in the stomach by [Unknown Party] #1, and choked by [Unknown Party] #2, where he pulled at an artery and tried to bust a vein.” (*Id.*, PageID.4.)

Plaintiff then jumps forward nearly a year, complaining that he was placed in segregation/SHU/START on January 4, 2024. (*Id.*, PageID.3.) Plaintiff reports that the isolating conditions in that setting exacerbated the symptoms of his serious mental illnesses, including

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<sup>2</sup> In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization, spelling, grammar, and punctuation in quotations from Plaintiff’s filings.

schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, and PTSD. (*Id.*) He states that he filed grievances regarding those conditions and that he was placed in those conditions in retaliation for those grievances. (*Id.*)

Plaintiff contends that each Defendant is liable for the conditions Plaintiff has suffered in segregation because he “kited all the above names and never received [an] adequate response.” (*Id.*)

Plaintiff contends that the Defendants violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, injunctive relief ordering Defendants Washington, Davis, Unknown Party #1, and Unknown Party #2 to stop Defendant Unknown Jenkins, and compensatory and punitive damages. (*Id.*, PageID.4, 6.)

#### **IV. Failure to State a Claim**

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Id.*; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of

misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Id.* at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

#### **A. Eighth Amendment Claim Relating to the February 2023 Incident**

The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” *Rhodes v. Chapman*, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are “totally without penological justification.” *Id.* However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation. *Parrish v. Johnson*, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); *see also Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under common law.’” *Cordell v. McKinney*, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Combs v. Wilkinson*, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” *Williams v. Curtin*, 631 F.3d 380,

383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Pelfrey v. Chambers*, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); *Bailey v. Golladay*, 421 F. App'x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011).

There is an objective component and a subjective component to this type of Eighth Amendment claim. *Santiago v. Ringle*, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing *Comstock v. McCrary*, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison officials.” *Williams*, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask, “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’” *Williams*, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition *de minimis* uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 9–10 (quoting *Whitley v. Albers*, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986)). The objective component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” *Id.* at 8 (quoting *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official, it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. *Wilkins v. Gaddy*, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant injury is evident.” *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 9.

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the February 2023 incident, though brief, permit an inference that the force used by Defendants Jenkins, Unknown Party #1, and Unknown Party #2, went beyond the force necessary to restore discipline. At this preliminary stage, therefore, the

Court will not dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against those Defendants.

As to the other Defendants, Plaintiff makes no allegations regarding the involvement of any other Defendant in the February 2023 incident. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. *See Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 545 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). The Sixth Circuit "has consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right." *Lanman v. Hinson*, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing *Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psych. Hosp.*, 286 F.3d 834, 842 (6th Cir. 2002)). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to *pro se* complaints. *See Frazier v. Michigan*, 41 F. App'x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); *Griffin v. Montgomery*, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at \*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant) (citing *Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn.*, 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998)); *Rodriguez v. Jabe*, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at \*1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) ("Plaintiff's claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries."). In Plaintiff's allegations regarding the February 2023 incident, he fails even to mention any Defendants other than Jenkins and the two unknown parties. With regard to the other Defendants, therefore, Plaintiff's allegations fall far short of the

minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).

Plaintiff notes that Defendant Washington “is legally responsible for the overall operation of the department and each institution under its jurisdiction including” ICF (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1), and that Defendant Davis “is legally responsible for the operation of [ICF] and for the welfare of all inmates in that prison” (*id.*, PageID.2). It is possible that Plaintiff intends to hold these high-ranking officials liable for the misconduct of their subordinates simply by virtue of their respective positions. But government officials, such as Defendants Washington and Davis, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676; *Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); *Everson v. Leis*, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. *Grinter v. Knight*, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); *Greene v. Barber*, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. *Grinter*, 532 F.3d at 576; *Greene*, 310 F.3d at 899; *Summers v. Leis*, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004).

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official:

“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable *unless* the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” *Shehee*, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”

*Peatross v. City of Memphis*, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting *Shehee v. Luttrell*, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)); *see also Copeland v. Machulis*, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995)).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants Washington or Davis encouraged or condoned the February 2023 conduct of Jenkins, Unknown Party #1, or Unknown Party #2, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of a supervisory relationship are insufficient to show that these Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. *See, e.g., Grinter*, 532 F.3d at 576; *Greene*, 310 F.3d at 899; *Summers*, 368 F.3d at 888.

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted relating to the February 2023 incident against any Defendants other than Jenkins and the unknown parties.

**B. Eighth Amendment Claim Relating to the Conditions of Confinement in Segregation**

The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be "barbarous," nor may it contravene society's "evolving standards of decency." *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 345–46. The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." *Ivey v. Wilson*, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 347; *see also Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998).

The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with "deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation" or "other conditions intolerable for prison confinement." *Rhodes*, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). "Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment." *Ivey*, 832 F.2d at 954. "[R]outine discomfort is 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.'" *Hudson*, 503 U.S. at 9 (quoting *Rhodes*, 452

U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” *Id.*

In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” *Mingus v. Butler*, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (applying deliberate indifference standard to medical claims)); *see also Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of confinement claims)). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective components. *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834; *Helling*, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” *Id.* at 837. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” *Id.* at 842. “It is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that risk.” *Id.* at 836.

Plaintiff’s description of the conditions of confinement in segregation are, at a minimum, troubling and could rise to the level of sufficiently serious risks to health or safety. His claim falls short, however, on the subjective prong. Plaintiff fails to allege facts that show any Defendant put Plaintiff into those conditions, much less that they put Plaintiff there knowing that the conditions posed an excessive risk of harm.

As explained above, it is essential to basic pleading that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. *See Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 545. “[D]amage claims against

government officials arising from alleged violations of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” *Lanman*, 529 F.3d at 684. Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to *pro se* complaints. *See Frazier*, 41 F. App’x at 764; *Griffin*, 2000 WL 1800569, at \*2; *Rodriguez*, 1990 WL 82722, at \*1.

The only allegation connecting the Defendants to the conditions of confinement in segregation is Plaintiff’s first factual allegation: “I kited all of the above names and never received an adequate response.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. *See Shehee*, 199 F.3d at 300. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s scant allegations against the Defendants fail to state an Eighth Amendment claim relating to the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement.

### C. Fourth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff does not explain what Fourth Amendment right the Defendants purportedly violated. The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. Generally, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Both the Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have recognized that, under the Fourth Amendment, prisoners and detainees may be subjected to intrusive searches such as strip searches and body-cavity searches without individualized suspicion. *See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders*, 566 U.S. 318, 333–34 (2012) (rejecting the argument that correctional officials need reasonable suspicion to conduct visual body-cavity searches upon inmates at the time they are admitted to the general jail population); *Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr.*, 705 F.3d 560, 575 (6th Cir. 2013) (noting that “suspicionless strip searches [are] permissible as a matter of constitutional law”). Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment still offers some protection in the prison environment. For example, strip searches “may be unreasonable by virtue of the way in which [they are] conducted.” *Williams v. City of Cleveland*, 771 F.3d 945, 952 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing

To the extent Plaintiff invokes the Fourth Amendment to protest the force used when he was “seized” during February of 2023, the invocation is misdirected. For convicted prisoners, such as Plaintiff, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment governs the use of excessive force. *See Wilkins v. Gaddy*, 559 U.S. 34, 37–39 (2010). In contrast, for pretrial detainees, the protection against the use of excessive force is afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, *see Kingsley v. Hendrickson*, 576 U.S. 389, 392–93 (2015); *see also Westmoreland v. Butler Cnty., Ky.*, 29 F.4th 721, 727 (6th Cir. 2022), *reh’g en banc denied*, 35 F.4th 1051 (6th Cir. 2022), and the Fourth Amendment protects against the use of excessive force against someone “in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure.’” *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

#### **D. Fourteenth Amendment Claims**

Plaintiff mentions that he “feel[s] that [his] . . . 14th Amendment rights were violated.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) He provides no further elaboration. Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s allegations might implicate the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or Due Process Clause.

##### **1. Equal Protection**

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially a

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*Stoudemire*, 705 F.3d at 574) (holding that searches must be conducted in a manner that is reasonably related to the jail’s legitimate objectives and that allegations that female prisoners were forced to sit on a chair and spread their labia in unsanitary conditions and in full view of other prisoners were sufficient to state a claim for unreasonable search and seizure). Plaintiff does not allege that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by such an unreasonable search.

direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; *City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.*, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, Plaintiff must show “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by the state; that is, he must show that he “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” *Village of Willowbrook v. Olech*, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The threshold element of an equal protection claim is disparate treatment. *Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ.*, 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, “[s]imilarly situated” is a term of art—a comparator . . . must be similar in ‘all relevant respects.’” *Paterek v. Vill. of Armada*, 801 F.3d 630, 650 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting *United States v. Green*, 654 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir. 2011)).

Plaintiff provides little factual detail, but he principally takes issue with the conditions in segregation and/or the START program presumably because they are not conditions to which general population inmates are subjected. Plaintiff, however, fails to allege any facts to suggest that general population inmates are similarly situated to inmates in segregation or the START program in all relevant aspects. Instead, to the extent his allegations suggest discriminatory treatment, they are wholly conclusory. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under Section 1983. *See Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678; *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, even viewing Plaintiff’s equal protection claims as class-of-one claims, the Court would reach the same conclusion because Plaintiff’s equal protection claims are wholly conclusory, and he has alleged no facts that plausibly suggest that his equal protection rights were violated.

Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts suggesting that the named Defendants were involved in the alleged violation of his equal protection rights, if any. *See*

*Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 92 F. App'x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); *Frazier*, 41 F. App'x at 764 (dismissing plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights). Therefore, any intended Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim is properly dismissed.

## 2. Procedural Due Process

“The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” *Bazzetta v. McGinnis*, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that one of these interests is at stake. *Wilkinson v. Austin*, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Analysis of a procedural due process claim involves two steps: “[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient . . . .” *Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson*, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (citations omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. *See Meachum v. Fano*, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In *Sandin v. Conner*, the Supreme Court set forth the standard for determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). According to that Court, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence,” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” *Id.* at 484, 486–87; *see also Jones v. Baker*, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); *Rimmer-Bey v. Brown*, 62 F.3d 789, 790–91 (6th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff does not allege that his placement in segregation and/or the START program affects the duration of his sentence, and he fails to allege sufficient facts to show that such placement is an atypical and significant deprivation. The Supreme Court repeatedly has held that a prisoner has no constitutional right to be incarcerated in a particular facility or to be held in a specific security classification. *See Olim v. Wakinekona*, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); *Moody v. Daggett*, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n.9 (1976); *Meachum*, 427 U.S. at 228–29. Although Plaintiff contends that the conditions he has endured are restrictive, they appear to be fairly standard conditions of segregation. Generally only periods of segregation lasting for a year or more have been found to be atypical and significant. *See, e.g., Selby v. Caruso*, 734 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding that thirteen years of segregation implicates a liberty interest); *Harris v. Caruso*, 465 F. App’x 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that eight years of segregation implicates a liberty interest); *Harden-Bey v. Rutter*, 524 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir. 2008) (remanding to the district court to consider whether the plaintiff’s allegedly “indefinite” period of segregation, i.e., three years without an explanation from prison officials, implicates a liberty interest).

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is complaining about conditions specific to the START program, the program “is less restrictive on the whole than the administrative segregation at issue in *Sandin*, [and thus] necessarily falls short of an atypical and significant hardship.” *Jackson v. Berean*, No. 1:18-cv-1075, 2019 WL 1253196, at \*11 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2019) *aff’d*, No. 19-1583, 2019 WL 6208147 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, 2019); *see also Dickerson v. Davids*, No. 1:21-cv-401, 2021 WL 3928667, at \*4 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2021).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims regarding his placement in segregation and/or the START program are properly dismissed.

It is also possible that Plaintiff's conclusory statement regarding a Fourteenth Amendment violation is directed at the Defendants' respective alleged failures to respond to Plaintiff's kites, essentially claiming some constitutional right to a response to his complaints. Various courts have held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. *See Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); *Walker v. Mich. Dep't of Corr.*, 128 F. App'x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); *Argue v. Hofmeyer*, 80 F. App'x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); *Young v. Gundy*, 30 F. App'x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); *see also Antonelli v. Sheahan*, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); *Adams v. Rice*, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). And Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. *See Olim*, 461 U.S. at 249; *Keenan v. Marker*, 23 F. App'x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); *Wynn v. Wolf*, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at \*1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Thus, because Plaintiff has no liberty interest in the grievance process, any interference with the grievance process did not deprive Plaintiff of due process.

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to allege that his right to petition the government was violated by any interference with the grievance process, this right is not violated by a failure to process or act on his grievances. The First Amendment "right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen's views." *Apple v. Glenn*, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); *see also Minnesota State Bd. for Cnty. Colls. v. Knight*, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the government may refuse to listen or respond). Indeed, Defendants' actions—or more accurately inactions—did not bar Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his grievances. *See Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). Indeed, Plaintiff's ability to seek redress is underscored by his *pro se* invocation of the judicial process. *See Azeez v.*

*DeRobertis*, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing a grievance, his right of access to the courts to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by his inability to file institutional grievances. *Cf. Ross v. Blake*, 578 U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by the interference of officials, the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is not required).

Accordingly any intended claims regarding the Defendants' alleged failure to respond to Plaintiff's kites are properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.

### 3. Substantive Due Process

It is also possible that Plaintiff's cryptic reference to the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to raise a substantive due process claim. "Substantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used." *Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs.*, 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Howard v. Grinage*, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, "[s]ubstantive due process 'prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" *Prater v. City of Burnside*, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). "Conduct shocks the conscience if it 'violates the decencies of civilized conduct.'" *Range v. Douglas*, 763 F.3d 573, 589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *County of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)).

"Where a particular [a]mendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that [a]mendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'" *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 273–75 (1994) (quoting *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 394

(1989)) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process, provides the standard for analyzing claims involving unreasonable search or seizure of free citizens). If such an amendment exists, the substantive due process claim is properly dismissed. *See Heike v. Guevara*, 519 F. App'x 911, 923 (6th Cir. 2013). In this case, where Plaintiff challenges the decency of his conditions of confinement and the use of excessive force, the Eighth Amendment protects Plaintiff.

Accordingly, any intended Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim is properly dismissed.

#### **E. First Amendment Retaliation**

Plaintiff does not specifically allege that his First Amendment rights were violated; but he states that he is being subjected to the conditions of confinement “in retaliation for filing grievances concerning [his] conditions.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) That statement implicates Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. *See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter*, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. *Id.* Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of his protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. *See Smith v. Campbell*, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing *Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle*, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).

The filing of a nonfrivolous prison grievance is constitutionally protected conduct for which a prisoner cannot be subjected to retaliation. *See Smith v. Campbell*, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001); *Herron v. Harrison*, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000). The right to file grievances

is protected only insofar as the grievances are not “frivolous.” *Herron*, 203 F.3d at 415. “Abusive or manipulative use of a grievance system would not be protected conduct,” *King v. Zamiara*, 680 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir. 2012), and an “inmate cannot immunize himself from adverse administrative action by prison officials merely by filing a grievance or a lawsuit and then claiming that everything that happens to him is retaliatory,” *Spies v. Voinovich*, 48 F. App’x 520, 525 (6th Cir. 2002). As the Supreme Court held in *Lewis v. Casey*, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), “[d]epriving someone of a frivolous claim . . . deprives him of nothing at all, except perhaps the punishment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions.” *Id.* at 353 n.3. Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support an inference regarding the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s grievances. Of particular note is Plaintiff’s failure to identify against whom he filed such grievances. Nonetheless, the Court will presume that Plaintiff’s grievances were nonfrivolous for purposes of this preliminary review.

To establish the second element of a retaliation claim, a prisoner-plaintiff must show adverse action by a prison official sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights. *Thaddeus-X*, 175 F.3d at 396. The adverseness inquiry is an objective one and does not depend on how a particular plaintiff reacted. The relevant question is whether the defendant’s conduct is “capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness;” the plaintiff need not show actual deterrence. *Bell v. Johnson*, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, the more restrictive conditions in segregation and/or the START program might reasonably deter a person of ordinary firmness from filing grievances.

To satisfy the third element of a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that support an inference that the alleged adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct. Plaintiff’s allegations fall short for two reasons.

First, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support the inference that the adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct because the adverse action—the conditions of his confinement in segregation and/or the START program—preceded the protected conduct. Plaintiff acknowledges that his grievances complained about the conditions of confinement. Put differently, Plaintiff alleges that the effect preceded the alleged cause. Second, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support the inference that Defendants were motivated to impose the adverse action by the protected conduct because Plaintiff does not allege that the Defendants imposed the adverse action at all. Ultimately, Plaintiff’s retaliation allegations consist of little more than the word “retaliation.” Such “conclusory statements, do not suffice.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678.

Accordingly, any intended First Amendment retaliation claim is properly dismissed.

### Conclusion

The Court will grant Plaintiff’s request to proceed *in forma pauperis*, but deny his request to appoint counsel and his request for preliminary injunctive relief.

Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Washington, Davis, Reynolds, and Highsmith for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, and Jenkins, *except* Plaintiff’s claims for those Defendants’ use of excessive force on February 2, 2023, at approximately 2:00 p.m. That Eighth Amendment excessive force claim remains in the case.

An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: March 3, 2025

/s/ Sally J. Berens  
SALLY J. BERENS  
 United States Magistrate Judge